
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AMERICAN

Nationalities for NIXON-LODGE

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THEODORE R. MCKELDIN CO-CHAIRMAN

JOHN RICHARDSON, JR.

HORACE E. HENDERSON EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

October 14, 1960

Mr. Allen W. Dulles Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Enclosed is a draft statement on cold war policy prepared in response to what seems to me to be an urgent need for specific statements in this area by the Vice President. I am sure that you will not agree with all of it but if you are in accordance with any part and think that it is as important as I do in the light of the present political situation, I hope that you will convey your views to the Vice President.

Sincerely yours,

John Richardson, Jr.

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE_

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CHAFT STAFFERENCE FOR HILLOW COLD WAR SHIATER

Markist-Keninist doctrine stresses the tactical taports ice of bewildering the enemy by alternating between "hard" and "qop; " in the struggle to overthrow free societies. We saw this restline to just last spring in the sudden reversal of Soviet attitudes agostical in Khrushchev's outbursts at the Summit Conference.

But these policy sig-zage take place not only for effective to esical reasons but also as a result of pressures arising within the Corrected from outside on the Communist block. Often the reasons for a cost to the interrelated.

shout under the inspiring leadership of President Lisenamer is a likely to produce initially any softening in the Soviet line. On the compy, the dictator's purposes to coming here having been frustrate and is tactis parried, pressures within and between the various form nist merties within the empire, as well as the external situation and his own emptional reaction, may induce an increase in tomorrow's vic curse I and violence.

Soviet policy, can induce retreats from over-extended positions. The reduce the risk of appailing denserous miscalculation for the Losson attacks. Sistorically all of these objectives have been achieved by the house although with far less consistency than we would wish.

What is absolutely essential in the future is that has sevie from not be freed of anxiety, rafe from any threat that her status our thisturbed, free of any threat from her slave empire. Those to the eat

as Mr. Stevenson does repeatedly, that the loviet Union way to elimin of our military power, afraid we are going to attack ther and there are must be constantly reassured as to our policy, not only siare dopen whole history of Soviet Sammunian, not only repeat precisely its and reasoning which led to Yalua, notedom and the whole sormy dis organization was retreat and appearement — they also unwittingly, patriot called out of a none the less disastrously fall into the Soviet trap. A coss until lowist Union, a Soviet Union free of anxiety, a Soviet Union free of any auternal pressure, is also a Soviet Union free to engage in trouble making and over the world.

We must always be premared to negotiate from strangth -- but at must always recognize that military strength, economic strength, a cis. etwength are not enough by themselves. Our purpose, the clarity of ou of justives, the precision of our non-military strategy -- these elements of supports are equally important. We cannot afford to yield the beviet nites the point that the area behind the Iron Curtain is out of bounds ...or sconomic and political warfare, while the deviet Union is on he offishsive all over the rost of the world. To do so could be datal. In do so is to give the Soviet Union a green light for more Cupas. Fore 11 1110s. all over the non- Communist world. Our primary purpose in the willist today is to help all peoples to achieve their God-given right to I'm selem and to help them build from institutions to and political slavers. economic and social exploitation and to assure the benefits at the scientific revolution to all. Only when this is achieved can them we a real peace, a peace with justice. This objective applies first this foremost to the peoples englayed within the Communist engine, to while we swe a direct moral obligation as a result of our swa blindsess is tralate war and early post-war period.

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We are engaged in a non-military protracted conflict with the raters of the Communist empire. They are aware of it and I am aware of it. The ebb and flow of our national awareness of this crucial fact i purities the single most critical problem confrontian America reday.

The Communist leaders would have us think that the only without of war is blood on the bat lefield; that disarrament means perce. In statements are not only false, but seem to have theroughly destrict time. American political leaders who ought to know better.

War to the Communist Resderanip is total at all times, he contributed is always one of choice of weapons. If both sides were to destroy and nuclear capabilities, both military and non-military warders could be waged by the Communists, unless they should abandon every ratio tenet of their doctrine, every lesson of their own success in their struggle for power since 1918.

What can we do, having first recognised the dimensions of the maggle and clarified our own objectives?

The answer is that we must concert our diplomatic, technolic and political strategy to achieve our epjectives. This I have bresond a do in the next administration under the leadership of Ambansadar soder, the negotiate to reach our real objectives from real strength when Soviet anxiety is high, when the urge for freedom within the desire is as a peak. We are able to protect the vulnerable areas of the world are in a soviet harrassment and encroacement, not only by economic, manufacted assistance, not only by fostering mutual understanding, but also be positive policies designed to impair Communist ability to despend on the encroach on these areas. There are contradictions of the most function and nature within the Soviet ampire between peoples and governments, help ton the various Communist operations between peoples and governments, help ton the various Communist perations of the most functions. Approved for Release 2003/07/29:CIA-RDPSOBS-676ROS/70005001850** . 17th; most fundamental of all, between or the and propagands. Pale to real said.

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system contains the obvious seeds of its own eventual destruction

We must see to it that those seeds are watered. It is in our self-interest. It is far less risky than the failure to recomment the nature of the struggle we are in -- with consequent insetion and mustiance on the good will of governments which recognize so walks in good will.

And such policies, pursued with determination and skill, offer the best hope of achieving freedom for oppressed nations without in, the best hope for the growth in freedom to eccamic and political stability of the undeveloped nations, the best hope for cance, justices and the rule of law in the world.

The above statement was prepared by John Lichardson, John 1 to a considerable extent on suggestions submitted by Loo tools be.

October 4, 1960